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Abstract
Approaches to quantum gravity often involve the disappearance of space and time at the funda-
mental level. The metaphysical consequences of this disappearance are profound, as is illustrated
with David Lewis’s analysis of modality. As Lewis’s possible worlds are unified by the spatiotem-
poral relations among their parts, the non-fundamentality of spacetime—if borne out—suggests
a serious problem for his analysis: his pluriverse, for all its ontological abundance, does not con-
tain our world. Although the mere existence—as opposed to the fundamentality—of spacetime
must be recovered from the fundamental structure in order to guarantee the empirical coherence
of the non-spatiotemporal fundamental theory, it does not suffice to salvage Lewis’s theory of
modality from the charge of rendering our actual world impossible.
1 Introduction
Various approaches to formulating a quantum theory of gravity either presuppose or entail that
fundamentally, there is neither space nor time. Instead, space and time emerge from the more
fundamental, non-spatiotemporal structure of quantum gravity very much in the way that tables
and chairs emerge from the more fundamental, non-chairtabular structure of quantum particle
physics.
This may have cataclysmic consequences for metaphysics: some philosophical analyses of cau-
sation, laws of nature, persistence, personal and material identity, and even modality crucially
seem to rely on the fundamental existence of space and time. For instance, David Lewis (1986)
characterizes possible worlds as unified by the spatiotemporal relations among their parts but as
spatiotemporally isolated from other possible worlds. If borne out, the disappearance of space and
time would motivate a new—fatal—objection to Lewis’s account of modality: his pluriverse, for all
its ontological abundance, does not contain our world.
Apart from questioning the truth of theories denying the fundamental existence of spacetime,
the Lewisian may respond in one of two ways to this shock: either the empirical coherence of any
theory denying the fundamental existence of space and time can be questioned, or it can be argued
that Lewisian modality only requires the existence, but not the fundamentality, of space and time.
This second response may succeed as long as it is assumed that no sensible theory of fundamental
physics questions the—perhaps non-fundamental—existence of space and time.
This essay contends that the first strategy fails, even though it unveils an important foundational
task for the defender of a theory-sans-fundamental spacetime. In order to avoid the charge of
empirical incoherence, and thus to salvage the possibility of its own epistemic justification, such
a theory must be shown to admit emergent spacetime. Thus, in circumventing the first Lewisian
∗I am indebted to Jonathan Cohen for comments on an earlier draft of this essay. Work on this project has been
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response the assumption of the second response—that spacetime exists at some ontological level—is
granted. However, this by no means entails that the second response succeeds. In fact, it is argued
that the merely emergent existence of space and time comes at an unpalatably high cost to Lewis.
§2 explicates the need for a quantum theory of gravity and argues that such a theory will be
our most fundamental theory of gravity, at least to date. In §3, I will show how spacetime may not
be part of the fundamental furniture of the world by introducing the conceptually simple and clean
case of causal set theory. §4 acts as a reminder of the fact that it is spatiotemporal relations that
unify and isolate worlds in Lewis’s pluriverse, and §5 parses out the trouble it encounters if those
spatiotemporal relations are absent. §6 and §7 articulate and discuss the two Lewisian strategies
in responding to the challenge presented, respectively. I offer some brief conclusions in §8
2 Quantum gravity and fundamentality
Today, there are two incumbent theories in physics with a serious claim to be not just true, but
fundamental theories: the standard model of particle physics and general relativity. The former
describes the structure of what are (so far) the smallest scales at which physics makes reliable
predictions and concerns the constitution of matter; the latter encodes the large-scale structure of
our universe and its history. Physicists believe that there exist four fundamental forces operating
in the physical realm; the standard model captures three of them, and general relativity the fourth.
Both theories make eminently accurate predictions and both stand unrefuted, at least if evidence
is restricted to direct tests of these theories.
Yet not everything is well in fundamental physics. For starters, the standard model and general
relativity stand in significant conceptual tension. The standard model radically reconceptualizes
matter and energy from the way they figured in pre-quantum theories, but general relativity relies
on these obsolete notions. General relativity proposes an equally radically novel understanding of
space and time and their joint interaction with their energy and matter content, departing from
the pre-relativistic physics of space and time presupposed by the standard model.1 This conceptual
disunity is philosophically unattractive, but the clincher for their joint untenability is that there
exist phenomena for which we have compelling reason to believe that their successful description
must involve both quantum and relativistic, i.e., gravitational, effects. In other words, a theory is
needed which commands the resources to combine the quantum with relativity. This is the theory
the field of quantum gravity seeks to formulate, and I shall call a quantum theory of gravity any
such theory with the explanatory ambition to account for these phenomena.
One might complain that the term ‘phenomena’ is ill-chosen given that they concern, e.g., the
physics of the very early universe and the hitherto unobserved evaporation of black holes. Of course,
it remains true that no observation, which is unambiguously quantum-gravitational in the sense
necessary to justify the need for quantum gravity, has knowingly been made to date. But while
the case for the evaporation of black holes may be more tenuous, the reasons to believe that our
universe started out in a very dense state and that this state can only be correctly captured by a
theory attending to both quantum and gravitational effects are firmly anchored in our currently best
physical theories, the standard model and general relativity. The argument which translates these
reasons into a need for a quantum theory of gravity requires little more in terms of assumptions
about the actual world we inhabit beyond these reigning theories. So for present purposes I shall
assume that a quantum theory of gravity is needed.
A quantum theory of gravity will be a fundamental theory, at least more fundamental than any
other theory in physics currently or previously held to be true. Presently, I use fundamentality to
1Or at least from the not fully relativistic assumptions made in the standard model.
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denote a relation between theories, partially ordering the true theories of physics, perhaps including
merely approximately true theories, or perhaps even including theories which have, or had, some
currency in science. The fact that a theory is more fundamental than another in no way entails
that the first theory is fundamental simpliciter. The relation I am interested in here is thus more
appropriately termed ‘relative fundamentality’, although I will often suppress the qualification in
what follows. Let us state what the relevant sort of fundamentality is.
To establish whether a given pair of theories exemplifies the relation of relative fundamentality
may be a highly non-trivial matter, particularly once one abandons the exclusive focus on physics.
For present purposes, I shall put aside this question and the more general debate on reductionism
it invites; both deserve greater care than I can devote to them here. For the sake of the present
argument, then, I rely on the conjunctive assumption that all hitherto relevant theories form part
of a partially ordered set and that this set has at least one minimal element in the sense that it
contains at least one theory that is not less fundamental than any other theory in the set of theories
considered. Let us call this set T . For T to contain at least one minimal element it suffices that
every totally ordered subset of T has a lower bound in T .2 To have a lower bound means that
for any subset of theories which are totally ordered with respect to fundamentality, there exists a
theory t in T—and not necessarily in the subset—which is the most fundamental.3 To demand that
T contain at least one minimal element does not rule out that there exist several distinct theories
with a justified claim to being the most fundamental.
My insistence that there exists at least one minimal element of T is usually given expression in
the stipulation that the partial ordering of T be ‘well-founded’. A binary relation which induces a
partial order on its domain is well-founded just in case every non-empty subset of the domain has
a minimal element with respect to the relation.4 5 Well-foundedness results in the present case
from the demand that “all priority claims terminate.” (Schaffer 2009, 500) In other words, if from
anywhere in the relevant set one starts asking the question whether there exists a theory which is
relatively more fundamental than the one at hand, and then whether there exists a theory which is
relatively more fundamental than that theory, etc, we must reach a negative answer within a finite
number of steps. This means that all subsets which are totally ordered must be finite.
My characterization of fundamentality differs from others prevalent in the literature. At least
in the philosophical literature, fundamentality is usually understood in ontological or ideological
terms rather than as a relation between theories. More specifically, fundamentality typically gets
explicated by relations of ontological dependence obtaining among objects or structures or by
mereological relations of parthood or by relations of supervenience holding among properties or
some combination of these, e.g. in that properties of objects which ontologically depend upon, or
are mereological complexes of, more basal or simple objects supervene on the properties exemplified
by the basal or simple objects. The relevant relations are then taken to induce a partial ordering on
their domain. To take theories to be the primary target of considerations regarding fundamentality
instead of the objects they describe and their properties reflects my conviction that in fundamental
physics theories indeed precede their ontological commitments and that it is thus more fruitful to
2This follows, mutatis mutandis, from Zorn’s lemma (Zorn 1935). For a subset A of a partially ordered set (B,≤),
an element x of B is a lower bound of A just in case for all a ∈ A, x ≤ a.
3At the danger of appearing excessively finicky, since the relevant ordering relation is irreflexive, and the ordering
hence a strict partial order, t is more fundamental, rather than just no less fundamental, than those in the subset
considered.
4More precisely, a partial order is well-founded if and only if the corresponding strict order is induced by a well-
founded relation. This precisification, however, adds nothing to the case at stake since ‘relative fundamentality’, as
stated above, is an irreflexive relation.
5Note also that in a subset consisting of just two theories, neither of which is more fundamental than the other,
both of its elements, rather than none, are minimal.
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address the question at the level of theories. Of course, the fundamentality relations as they obtain
among theories will entail relations of ontological dependence among the objects or structures
they postulate and relations of supervenience among the properties they ascribe to these objects
or structures. In fact, one would hope that judgments about the fundamentality of theories are
precisely mirrored by judgments concerning other ways in which fundamentality is considered.
Under the current description, the attempted quantum theory of gravity will certainly be more
fundamental than general relativity if its ambition will be actualized. After all, this is its stated goal:
to offer a theory of gravity which cannot only deal with the relativistic aspects of gravity, and hence
of spacetime, but which also incorporates pertinent quantum effects. In other words, it endeavours
to deliver a fundamental theory of gravity, and as such will be more fundamental than our currently
most fundamental theory of gravity. Depending on the particular features of a candidate theory
of quantum gravity, it may or may not be more fundamental than the standard model of particle
physics. As stated above, the standard model offers our currently most fundamental theory of the
three non-gravitational forces. Thus, if the quantum theory of gravity to be does not only provide
a fundamental theory of gravity, but instead a unified theory of all forces, then it will also be
more fundamental than the standard model. Such is the ambition harboured by string theory, for
example. If, however, it only amounts to a fundamental theory of gravity, then it will not be more
fundamental than the standard model. This will be the case, e.g., for most approaches trying to
quantize general relativity such as loop quantum gravity and for most approaches starting out from
more revisionary assumptions such as causal set theory. It should be noted, however, that it is also
not the case that the standard model is more fundamental than these approaches.
In either case, the quantum theory of gravity will be a minimal element of T and thus among
the most fundamental theories, at least to date. Let us proceed on this premise.
3 The disappearance of space and time
According to most approaches to quantum gravity, spacetime is not part of the fundamental fur-
niture of our world, but merely ‘emergent’. What I mean by this is that whatever fundamental
structure a theory of quantum gravity postulates, it is importantly dissimilar from the structure
‘spacetime’ refers to in general relativity or other, non-fundamental theories of gravity or of space-
time. For instance, in a vast class of approaches to quantum gravity, the fundamental structure
is discrete.6 In so-called canonical approaches to quantum gravity, there is a strong suggestion
that at least time is not fundamental.7 Dualities in string theory may be interpreted to mean
that space(time) is not fundamental in string theory either. The so-called Weyl symmetry of the
‘internal metric’ already present in plain vanilla string theories is often interpreted, at least among
physicists, as rendering unnecessary the background spacetime in which the string was at first as-
sumed to propagate.8 Taking the theory ontologically seriously, as string theorists tend to, thus
means accepting the vanishing of the spacetime at the fundamental level. In non-commutative
geometry, an approach related to string theory, the fundamental constituents replacing the familiar
spatiotemporal quantities in different dimensions do not commute, i.e. where measuring quantities
along different dimension depends on the order in which these measurement are made. Despite
its spatiotemporal vestige, the non-commutativity of the approach renders the fundamental struc-
ture profoundly different from the ordinary conception of spacetime. And the examples could be
multiplied.
6Smolin (2009, 549).
7Huggett et al. (2013, §2).
8Witten (1996), but cf. also (Huggett et al. 2013, §3).
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But rather than fully establishing the assertion that approaches to quantum gravity generically
deny the fundamental existence of space and time, I shall content myself with offering a representa-
tive yet tractable example: causal set theory. Causal set theory is a still inchoate, but conceptually
clean approach to quantum gravity, which may serve as a perfect illustration for how radically a
discrete fundamental structure differs from our usual conception of spacetime. Causal set theory
is based on the assumption that the fundamental structure is a discrete set of featureless basal
events partially ordered by causality. It is motivated by theorems in general relativity by Stephen
Hawking et al. (1976) and David Malament (1977) which establish that given the causal struc-
ture and some volume information, the metric of the spacetime manifold is determined, as is its
dimension, topology, and differential structure. In other words, the causal structure determines
the geometry, albeit not the ‘size’ of the spacetime. Based on these theorems, causal set theory
asserts that the fundamental structure is a ‘causal set’ and thus that causality is prior to space and
time. Furthermore, the presupposition of the discreteness of the fundamental structure is justified
through its technical and conceptual utility.
Slightly more formally, causal set theory postulates that the fundamental structure is a causal
set C, i.e. an ordered pair 〈C,〉 consisting of a set C of elementary events and a relation, denoted
by the infix , defined on C satisfying two conditions: first,  induces a partial order on C (i.e. 
is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive); second, C is discrete in that the number of elements of
C which are causally ‘between’ any two points in C is finite.9 That the discreteness is stipulated is
not in itself a problem, as long as it is ultimately vindicated by the scientific success of the theory.
Thus, it is a feature of the theory.
Causal set theory is plagued by two major challenges. First, like other discrete relational
approaches to quantum gravity, it suffers from what is known as the ‘entropy crisis’, viz. that the
vast majority of basic structures satisfying the above postulate cannot be approximated by, or
physically related to, a relativistic spacetime. In other words, for most causal sets in causal set
theory, no spacetime even remotely resembling ours emerges from it. Second, causal set theory as
it has been articulated so far is a classical theory—it does not take quantum interference effects
into account. This is hardly satisfactory when the goal was to produce a quantum theory of gravity.
The hitherto unfulfilled hope is to kill both birds with one stone: both problems would be solved if
only one could formulate additional constraints on the causal sets which exactly pick those causal
sets with general-relativistic pendants and simultaneously act as independently justified principles
governing an appropriately quantum dynamics. Thus, the goal is to formulate the dynamics in
some principled and physically motivated way such that the dynamics will ‘drive’ the causal sets
to those which do in fact approximate a general-relativistic spacetime.
It must be emphasized, however, that philosophers should not be misled by the presence of these
difficulties to dismiss causal set theory altogether and much less to shrug off its basic tenet that
the fundamental is discrete and thus dissimilar from spacetime as we find it in all prior and less
fundamental theories. As pronounced above, the discreteness of the fundamental structure is quite
common. In fact, it is so strongly expected that entire research programmes—and not just causal
set theory—are based on the presupposition that the fundamental structure in quantum gravity—
whatever else it might exactly turn out to be—is discrete. So like all other approaches to quantum
gravity, causal set theory is not without its share of foundational problems. Pointing these out does
not, however, make for an interesting objection against the argument about to be offered as the
disappearance of spacetime at the fundamental level is quite generic in quantum theories of gravity.
In this sense, the following argument does not depend on the truth of causal set theory in particular.
Causal set theory permits an easily tractable illustration of much more general features of quantum
9More technically still, the second axiom demands that ∀a, b ∈ C, card{x ∈ C|a  x  b} <∞.
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theories of gravity. The argument only relies on the recognition that the non-fundamentality of
spacetime is generically either an assumption or a consequence of quantum theories of gravity, at
least for extant ones.
Furthermore, it could be complained that all causal set theory would establish, if borne out,
was that spacetime just looked a bit different from what we expected when we thought that general
relativity was our best theory of it. Sure, the complaint admits, spacetime is not the continuum
that general relativity taught us it was; instead, we learn that spacetime is a discrete structure.
But why should such progress in learning about the properties of spacetime—if progress it is—have
any consequences for metaphysics, the complaint rhetorically asks.
If the point is simply to insist that we call ‘spacetime’ whatever fundamental structure gives rise
to space and time as experienced by ordinary humans, then we have no debate. But the complaint
would be mistaken if it purported that the fundamental structure shares the essential properties of
ordinary space and time and hence deserves the honorific title of ‘spacetime’. First, almost all phys-
ical theories taught today demonstrably rely on the assumption that space and time are (infinitely)
extended continua, as do a number of metaphysical theories of (diachronic) personal, or generally
material, identity, of causation, of laws of nature, as well as characterizations of determinism, etc.
Thus, discrete spacetime would conceptually diverge from what is assumed to be evidently the
case in all these theories and could no longer serve as their basis. Second, and more seriously,
it takes hard—and controversial—work by mathematical physicists to even define the concepts
necessary to attribute to discrete structures properties that we so routinely see exemplified by con-
tinuous spacetimes. The affine and differentiable structure evaporates, usual topological concepts
become inapplicable, metric properties must be entirely revamped and redefined and dissertations
are necessary to work out reasonable notions of the discrete correlate of the dimension of a smooth
manifold. All these usual concepts developed to articulate the properties of continuous spacetimes,
including, most importantly, metric properties of duration and length, become inapplicable. Worse,
the discrete structures of causal set theory arguably do not possess metric properties at all.
Just as it would be presumptuous to call phlogiston ‘oxygen’ and attribute the differences simply
to the ignorance of phlogiston theorists about what oxygen really is, it would be mistaken to label
these discrete structures ‘spacetime’, given these profound differences. Terms assume their meaning
in the holistic context of the theories in which they operate; if these contexts shift radically, it makes
no sense to insist on the same term. In fact, using homonyms for profoundly distinct concepts only
invites misapprehensions.
Finally, there are two concerns regarding the fundamentality of a quantum theory of grav-
ity. First, one might worry that other fundamental theories might frustrate the conclusion that
spacetime does not exist, fundamentally. As elaborated in §2, the requisite fundamentality is not
jealous—there could be many minimal theories in the partially ordered set T as the well-foundedness
did not require uniqueness. So even if no other theory is more fundamental than our quantum the-
ory of gravity, it may still be the case that this is also true of many other theories. In particular, as
may be welcomed by some, this notion of fundamentality also permits the failure of reductionism
in that the existence of entirely disparate subsets of theories, i.e., subsets of T across which no
fundamentality relations hold. For example, physical theories may be ordered according to funda-
mentality among themselves and likewise for biological theories, with relative fundamentality not
exemplified by any physico-biological pair of relata. Closer to the case at hand, if our quantum
theory of gravity is such as to remain silent about the other three forces, it can only hope to be more
fundamental than general relativity, but not than the standard model. It is certainly conceivable
that if there is a plurality of minimal elements in T , only one of which is our quantum theory
of gravity, then different minimal elements may return different verdicts regarding the status of
spacetime. So even if our quantum theory of gravity declared that there is no spacetime, other
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theories might postulate its existence and by virtue of their fundamentality insist that it does so
fundamentally. How to regulate the jurisdictions in such a case?
In response to this worry, the first point to note is that whatever set of minimal theories we
have, it must be consistent. I take this not to imply that different elements of T cannot assert
different, and perhaps even inconsistent, propositions. What it does imply at a minimum, however,
is that should such a case arise, then not both theories can be strictly true. At best, one of them
is true, and the other one only approximately so. This means that one theory takes precedence
over the other, at least with respect to the claims at stake. It also means that we should ideally
possess a procedure to adjudicate the dispute over conflicting jurisdictions. Unfortunately, I know
of no principled way of doing so generally. But we do not need a generally valid procedure; it
suffices to provide an argument that a quantum theory of gravity’s pronouncements regarding the
fate of spacetime trumps those of other fundamental theories. And such an argument is readily
available: our hitherto most accurate theory of spacetime is general relativity, our quantum theory
of gravity is more fundamental than general relativity, so the nature of that fundamental structure
which gives rise to relativistic spacetimes is most authoritatively described by the quantum theory
of gravity.
A second worry someone might voice trades on the fact that even though fundamentality is
intended without regard of the contingencies of the current state of science, it may be that as yet
unformulated theories will revert the verdict on spacetime as it is handed to us by extant quantum
theories of gravity. As stated in §2, I would not presently want to be bound by the claim that the
discovery of ever more fundamental theories peters out at some finite level. Perhaps it is turtles all
the way down. Regardless of how many more fundamental levels will be uncovered, the possibility
which instigates the present worry forces me to stipulate that at the most fundamental one or, in the
case of infinitely many, all which are more fundamental than some level do not reverse the outcome
of §3, viz. that fundamentally, there is no spacetime. As long as this condition is honoured, the
contingencies of future science do not affect the argument below. I believe that current research in
fundamental physics warrants the tentative imposition of this condition and thus underwrites that
there is no spacetime at the fundamental level, but I also understand that this warrant is fallible.
Let us then, at least for the purposes of this essay, accept that spacetime does not exist,
fundamentally.
4 What unifies a Lewisian world
Assuming familiarity at least with the basic ideas of Lewis’s account of modality in terms of possible
worlds as it is articulated in his 1986 et passim, let me remind you of what Lewis claims unifies
possible worlds. In the section entitled ‘Isolation’ (§1.6), he addresses the question of by virtue of
what two possibilia are ‘worldmates’, i.e. denizens of the same possible world, and thus of what
unifies possible worlds. For him, possible worlds are unified by the spatiotemporal relations holding
among possibilia, and are distinct by virtue of being spatiotemporally isolated from one another.
In his own words,
... things are worldmates iff they are spatiotemporally related. A world is unified, then,
by the spatiotemporal interrelation of its parts. There are no spatiotemporal relations
across the boundary between one world and another; but no matter how we draw the
boundary within a world, there will be spatiotemporal relations across it. (1986, 71)
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Lewis himself identifies three problems with his account.10 These problems, or perhaps rather
limitations of the account, concern the necessity of the condition much more so than its sufficiency.
First, it does not permit a world to “consist of two or more completely disconnected spacetimes.”
(71) This limits Lewis’s account insofar as a world which can be represented as the union of
at least two disjoint non-empty spacetimes is deemed impossible. The relevant sense in which
these spacetimes are disjoint, of course, must be that no spatiotemporal relations are exemplified
by relata located in topologically separate parts of this world. As Lewis admits, and regrets,
the impossibility of such worlds, he offers substitutes, i.e. possible worlds which exhibit some
features emulating what a proponent of the possibility of disconnected spacetimes might have
cared about. For instance, worlds might possess additional, covert, spatiotemporal dimensions
along which seemingly disconnected regions of spacetime connect; or otherwise disjoint regions
might be connected by virtue of their being embedded in a single spacetime such that topological
or metric oddities effectively cordon off the regions from one another.
This limitation might worry a naturalist who takes recently popular multiverse proposals meta-
physically serious. However varied these proposals may be, they all essentially defend the theses
that our universe is just one among many, and that these alternate universes are causally discon-
nected from ours. If this were true of our world—and if there indeed are no spatiotemporal relations
obtaining across universes in a way that cannot be cured by substitutes—, then Lewis’s account of
modality would rule out our actual world as impossible. The trouble with this conditional, unlike
the one defended in the main argument of this essay, is that I find little reason to accept either—
let alone both—of the antecedents. While an analysis of the evidential claims made in favour of
multiverse hypotheses would require an entirely separate paper, the more plausible versions of it
do not sanction the second antecedent as they assume that all the universes, as causally separate
as they may be, are bubbles embedded in a larger spacetime, connecting them in the presently
relevant way. I conclude that this limitation does not pose a serious threat to Lewis’s analysis from
a naturalistic perspective.
The second issue with his analysis, on Lewis’s own view, is that it is impossible that there is
nothing. There needs to be at least a tiny bit of “homogeneous unoccupied spacetime, or maybe
only a single point of it” (73) for there to be a world at all. Lewis accepts that on his view, it comes
out as a necessary truth that there is something rather than absolutely nothing at all. However,
he repudiates that this explains in any way why this is so, as for him, explanation is etiological,
i.e. in the business of providing a causal account, as is evidently not the case here. So long as
this consequence is not mistaken as an explanation, Lewis is happy to accept it as a feature of his
analysis, and so am I.
Thirdly, and most disconcertingly for Lewis himself, it seems as if a world in which events
are related by two distinct types of ‘distance’—temporal and spatial—such as a Newtonian world
ought to be possible, even though events in it are not related by ontologically fundamentally
distinct spatiotemporal relations, as demanded by the condition. Of course, one might also want
to include worlds in which, e.g., spatial distances are not naturally part of the story of how this
world is interrelated, but are instead replaced by three distances: that along the left-right axis,
along the up-down axis, and along the front-back axis. It might just turn out that these distances
are essentially different in this world and in others like it, thus resulting in four, and not just two,
distances by which objects in those worlds are related. Since there is no good reason to think
that such worlds are impossible, the generalized version of this complaint continues, to demand
that worlds are spatiotemporally bound is overly narrow. What we dub ‘spatiotemporal relations’
10In fact, Lewis briefly addresses a fourth worry concerning the possibility of spirits living outside of space altogether.
I shall ignore it here.
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is grounded in their behaviour in the actual world. The question which then arises is whether
those other multiple distance relations obtaining in these other worlds are really nothing but our
spatiotemporal relations which “double up” to deliver several distances, or whether the latter are
different relations altogether, which “take the place” of our spatiotemporal relations. If the former,
we need not worry, Lewis assures us, quite correctly in my view. If the latter, however, a can of
worms in the metaphysics of relations is opened. He offers to deal with this objection by accepting
that
[w]hat I need to say is that each world is interrelated (and is maximal to such interrela-
tion) by a system of relations which, if they are not the spatiotemporal relations rightly
so called, are at any rate analogous to them. (75)
He then goes on to state some preliminary points of analogy these ‘analogically spatiotemporal’
relations must satisfy. The relations, at a minimum, must be ‘natural’ (i.e. not gerrymandered or
disjunctive), ‘pervasive’ (i.e. if relata are connected by a chain of relations, they are also directly
so related), ‘discriminating’ (i.e. in sufficiently large worlds, the relata are possibly identified by
a unique place in the structure of relations), and ‘external’ (i.e. not supervenient on the intrinsic
natures of the relata). Lewis also considers, but ultimately rejects, a simplification circumventing
the difficulty of having to deal with this messy business by relaxing the condition that worlds
must be unified by at least analogically spatiotemporal relations to the condition that they can
be unified merely by virtue of some natural external relation. However the further details of the
metaphysics of analogically spatiotemporal relations in Lewis’s pluriverse look like, let me emphasize
the dilemma Lewis faces at this juncture. Either the candidate relations (such as Newtonian
spatial and temporal distances) unifying what he takes to be a nomologically distant world are
nothing but our spatiotemporal relations behaving somewhat differently; or else they really are
non-spatiotemporal, in which case the world they are supposed to unify is only possible if they are
analogically spatiotemporal.
5 Unification failure
But now another problem arises in the light of the findings in §3. If borne out, the disappearance
of space and time would motivate a new and, I would claim, fatal objection to Lewis’s account of
modality: despite its modal embarras de richesses, his pluriverse does not contain our world. In
other words, if all there is is contained in the pluriverse of all possible worlds, then the actual world
would not exist, as it would not be a possible world. This follows immediately from the fact that
in no possible causal set, we have at least a tiny bit of “homogeneous unoccupied spacetime”. The
basic constituents of a causal set stand in causal, but not spatiotemporal, relations to one another.
This seems to leave open the possibility of a world consisting of just one basal event, which perhaps
could “double up” as a single point of spacetime. By virtue of what would this single event be
a single point of spacetime? Spacetime, according to causal set theory, is an emergent, not a
fundamental concept. But even if a single basal event doubling up as a point of spacetime is
granted for the sake of argument, it seems as if at most one basal and structureless event populates
a possible world.
In other words, all the basic elements of a causal set must live in different possible worlds
according to the Lewisian condition, or so it seems. If, per the usual assumption in causal set theory,
one such element of the fundamental structure corresponds to a Planck-sized volume of spacetime,
then the observable part of our actual universe corresponds to something like a gargantuan 10185
basic elements. If there is no doubling up or analogically spatiotemporal about such a causal set,
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Figure 1: As shown in this Hasse diagram of (a section of) a causal set, events p and q are
connected by a chain of causal relations (bold lines), yet do not stand in a direct causal relation.
A Hasse diagram represents the antisymmetry of the partial ordering by vertical stacking.
then it appears that these elements must constitute numerically distinct worlds. In order to form
something like the causal set representing the fundamental structure of our actual universe, an
even more gargantuan number of causal relations must obtain across worlds. But Lewis rejects
trans-world causation, and quite plausibly so. This injunction of causal isolation leaves us with a
large number of possible worlds populated by just one basal event. But since these basal events
obtain their identity only structurally,11 we stand bereft of any power to ground their identity and
hence their numerical plurality.
Whether all these 10185 elements give rise to numerically distinct possible worlds, or whether
they are numerically one and the same shall not concern us here. What is pertinent is the fact that
a possible world containing nothing but a single basal element of a causal set looks nothing at all
like our actual world. Hence, the actual world, if fundamentally as causal set theory asserts, is not
a possible world in the Lewisian pluriverse.
Or at least not if the causal relations exemplified in the fundamental structure either do not
double up as spatiotemporal relations or are not analogically spatiotemporal. We can safely dis-
miss the first possibility: the causal relations featured in causal set theory are expressly not the
spatiotemporal relations just behaving a little differently. They give rise to spatiotemporal rela-
tions, as we will see below, but differ markedly in both their extensional properties as well as their
intensional role in the theory, as explained in §3. Thus, we are left with the option that the causal
relations at work in the fundamental structure are analogically spatiotemporal. Unfortunately, this
will not work, at least not of the four criteria of analogy listed above are intended as necessary for
the analogy to succeed. The condition that they be discriminating will only be honoured thinly,
in that for large causal sets, we generically expect them to fail to discriminate among all basal
events (BLINDED). But the true culprit to fail the analogy is the demanded pervasiveness, which
is routinely violated. Even though all events are integrated into the structure of a causal set and
are typically causally linked to all other events in the causal set via long chains of causal relations,
it is generally not the case that any given pair of them also stands in a direct causal relation, as
is illustrated in Figure 1. This failure occurs for instance in ‘space-like related’ events and results
from the conjoined effects of the asymmetry of the fundamental relation and the partiality of the
order it induces.12
11BLINDED.
12It should also be added that even though Lewis also considers causal relations, and particularly the possibility
of their obtaining across worlds, he does not entertain them as solely sufficient to bind worlds. Lewis also declines to
introduce a primitive worldmate relation vested with all the necessary unifying power.
10
Thus, the causal relations present in the fundamental structure of our world as conceived by
causal set theory neither double up with spatiotemporal relations nor are they analogically spa-
tiotemporal. Since it is necessary, and not merely sufficient, for worldmates to stand either in
spatiotemporal relations or in external relations which double for spatiotemporal relations or in
analogically spatiotemporal relations, non-trivial causal sets do not constitute possible worlds in
Lewis’s sense. Therefore, because what is not possible cannot exist—for both the actualist and the
modal realist—we have a new problem: the non-existence of the actual world.13 Instead of many
non-actual possible worlds, we have a non-possible actual world!
6 The charge of empirical incoherence
There are two rather immediate ways to retort to the remonstrance against Lewis’s account of
modality as formulated in the previous section. First, the Lewisian may argue that the mere
existence—as opposed to the fundamentality—of spacetime, and of spatiotemporal relations, suf-
fices to hold together worlds; surely, the mere existence of spacetime should be granted. To deny
the very existence of space and time could perhaps take the form of idealism about them; but an
entirely different sort of charge would have to be sounded against Lewis if such a conclusion were
the goal of the argument. This essay accepts a rather plain form of realism and has no interest
in pursuing this line of attack. A second Lewisian rebuttal arges that spacetime is necessary in
order to guarantee the empirical coherence of any theory in the empirical sciences. Let us address
the responses of the sufficiency of the non-fundamental existence of spacetime and of the empirical
incoherence in reverse order.
Let me explain, then, how the absence of spacetime may incur a worry about the empirical
coherence of a theory-sans-spacetime. If one believes, with Tim Maudlin (2007), that any realist
interpretation of quantum mechanics must include ‘local beables’ in its ontology, then one might
be tempted to charge any theory denying the fundamental existence of spacetime with empirical
incoherence. Coined by John Bell (1987), ‘local beables’ in quantum mechanics are basic existents
“which are definitely associated with particular space-time regions.” (234) They represent the
physical content of the universe, they make up the ‘stuff’ we find in our world. Whatever else their
properties, Maudlin (2007) makes it explicit that they require space and time when he asserts that
“local beables do not merely exist: they exist somewhere.” (3157) Now abstracting away from non-
relativistic quantum mechanics, insisting that the basic ontology of a theory includes local beables
thus entails a commitment to spacetime itself being a part of the basic furniture of the world (and
hence not emergent at a higher level). Whatever else confirmation in an empirical theory involves,
the observation of something located in some place at some time will play an ineliminable role in
it.
Thus, it appears as if denying such fundamental existence to spacetime threatens a theory’s
‘empirical coherence’ in the sense of Jeff Barrett (1999), who defines a theory to be empirically
incoherent just in case the truth of the theory undermines our empirical justification for accepting it
as true.14 A theory denying the fundamental existence of spacetime is thus alleged to be empirically
incoherent because the empirical justification of a theory derives only from our observation of the
effects of local beables situated in spacetime; yet if such a theory were true, there could be no such
local beables.
To be sure, Maudlin (2007, 3161) accepts that it would be sufficient in principle to derive the
13The reader is reminded that we proceeded in §3 on the assumption that causal set theory or a relevantly similar
theory is a true fundamental theory of our world.
14Cf. Barrett (1999, §4.5.2).
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structure of the local beables and the spacetime that contains them from a fundamental ontology
free of spacetime and hence of local beables. Such a derivation would permit an empirical grounding
of the theory-sans-spacetime, as long as it is “physically salient (rather than merely mathematically
definable).” (ibid.; emphasis added) Maudlin implies, however, that we do not even know how such
a “physically salient” derivation could be undertaken, let alone having it at our disposal.
To summarize then, a necessary condition to circumvent the charge of empirical incoherence is
to offer a “physically salient” derivation of spacetime from the basic, non-spatiotemporal structure.
In other words, it must be shown how general-relativistic spacetime emerges as an approximation
in quantum theories of gravity. The task of recovering the smooth relativistic spacetime from the
discrete fundamental structure is also important in the ‘context of justification’, as its discharge
provides an account of why the classical spacetime theory—general relativity—is as successful as
it is. Understanding how spacetime emerges is thus doubly urgent: to establish the fundamental
theory’s empirical coherence by connecting it to evidence in the form of spatiotemporally located
beables, and to provide an explanation of the successes—and failures—of the predecessor theory
by relating the fundamental structures to relativistic spacetimes.
The necessity of recovering spacetime in a well-understood approximation arises for every quan-
tum theory of gravity which denies its fundamental existence. As I have asserted above, this applies
to most approaches in quantum gravity. How exactly spacetime can be recovered depends on the
particular approach taken and remains an open question for many of them. I have explicated
the general idea for completing this task—cum attendant difficulties—as it appears in causal set
theory in BLINDED. For the present purpose, however, let us assume that the endeavour is both
acknowledged and can be successfully completed.
7 Emergent salvation?
Given the outcome of §6, the existence of spacetime is assured, albeit not at the fundamental level.
Spacetime, just like tables and chairs, is non-fundamental, but existent. The non-fundamentality
clearly does not entail the non-existence of spacetime, just as it didn’t for tables and chairs. In
fact, by acknowledging the necessity of a “physically salient” emergence of spacetime, its existence
was accepted, at least in an appropriate approximation. The needed spatiotemporal relations
exemplified by pairs of worldmates, the thought goes, may well be ontologically dependent upon
some more fundamental structure. Consequently, their relata need not, and in general will not, be
fundamental objects either.
Of course, this existential acknowledgement would only save the Lewisian if the non-fundamental
existence of spacetime were sufficient to unify (and isolate) worlds. Unfortunately, this is not the
case. There are two principal reasons why this emergent salvation of Lewis’s theory of modality
fails. First, a metaphysician will hardly be satisfied by being offered what physicists call an ‘effective
theory’, i.e. an at best approximately true theory which ignores the fundamental reality in favour of
a description of emergent phenomena. One might have thought that the argument in §6 established
that any fundamental theory must be compatible with a theory of emergent spacetime which is
true simpliciter in order to guarantee its empirical coherence. After all, how could a false theory
ground our empirical judgments? Unfortunately, this will simply not be borne out: the relevant
theory of emergent spacetime is general relativity, and general relativity’s failure in regimes with
strong gravitational fields where quantum effects matter was the very reason a quantum theory of
gravity was sought in the first place. Thus, general relativity will be false in its pronouncements
in these regimes. And it will only be approximately true in more placid domains. A remarkably
accurate approximation, but an approximation nevertheless. Just as most of our statements about
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tables and chairs are true simpliciter, many statements concerning the observable domain entailed
by general relativity will be true simpliciter. But just as in our folk theories of tables and chairs,
not all will, frustrating the theory’s truth simpliciter. So that’s the non-fundamentalist Lewisian’s
first problem: worlds are unified by relations furnished by theories which are strictly speaking false.
Secondly, a Lewisian theory of modality trading in emergent spatiotemporal relations must
remain impotent in binding the basic constituents of actuality into one and the same possible
world. The reason for this impotence is simple: there are no spatiotemporal relations exemplified
in the fundamental structure of a causal set, and the basal elements of this structure cannot be the
relata of the emergent spacetime relations.
This latter claim needs explicating. If spatiotemporal relations did obtain between elementary
events, then propositions asserting corresponding facts such as ‘This event and that event are at
such-and-such spatiotemporal distance’ would be meaningful. But metrical (and many topological
etc.) concepts are inapplicable at the fundamental level of causal sets, as was argued in §3. It
is notoriously difficult to define geometric notions in purely fundamental terms, i.e., in terms of
causal set theory. There are various difficulties. First, even if successful, we should expect that
our familiar geometric notions will only approximately track the fundamental magnitudes, even
if the analogy is as strong as it can be. Secondly, even for those magnitudes for which the fit
is reasonably close, we should expect that they will give out in exactly those regimes for which
general relativity was found wanting. Thirdly, many of the fundamental notions defined in the
literature rely in their ability to successfully emulate emergent geometric notions on additional
substantive assumptions about either the fundamental causal set or the emergent spacetime, or
both. For instance, the notion of spatial distance has been plagued by all these difficulties (Rideout
and Wallden 2009). The only somewhat promising ansatz to define a notion which gives rise to
something like a spatial distance in the literature (offered in Rideout and Wallden 2009), can only
(approximately) reproduce distance in Minkowski spacetime, but not in curved spacetimes. Since
general relativity insists that our actual world is best understood as having a curved spacetime
structure, this proposal does not help in saving the actual world from the impending impossibility.
One might be tempted to impose, by a strong hand, spatiotemporal relations to obtain between
the basal events of a fundamental causal set, as follows. Suppose we have a relativistic spacetime
and the fundamental causal set it approximates. Showing that the spacetime emerges from the
causal set essentially amounts to finding a map f , satisfying certain conditions of well-behavedness
that need not concern us here, from the causal set to the spacetime. For any two basal events
a and b in the causal set, f(a) and f(b), being elements of the spacetime, surely stand in some
spatiotemporal relation to one another. Since f is injective, i.e., every element of its domain is
unambiguously mapped onto an element of its range, it seems as if this move is available for any
pair of basal events of any causal set which has any prayer of giving rise to an emergent spacetime.
Since by definition no spatiotemporal relations are defined at the fundamental level of a causal set,
couldn’t one introduce surrogate spatiotemporal relations by stipulating that any two events a and
b of a causal set stand in the spatiotemporal relation R just in case the two spacetime points f(a)
and f(b) stand in R?
Thus, one would start out from a fundamental causal set capturing the fundamental structure
of a world such as ours, find the relativistic spacetime which emerges from it, and then extend
the spatiotemporal relations as they are defined of the spacetime points to obtain of pairs of basal
events, as suggested in the previous paragraph. Unfortunately, as straightforward as this procedure
appears, it is marred with insurmountable difficulties. First, it turns out that most causal sets
admitted by the basic axioms of the theory cannot be embedded into a spacetime, as stated in §3.
For all these causal sets it would still be the case that they do not constitute possible worlds on the
Lewisian analysis of modality. On the one hand, this would not be much of a loss, since none of
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these causal sets can describe the fundamental structure of our actual world, on pain of empirical
incoherence. On the other hand, this would have the odd consequence that the theory correctly
describing the fundamental structure of our world asserts nomological possibilities which are not
metaphysically possible. Usually, the metaphysically possible worlds are considered a (proper)
superset of the physically possible worlds. This would no longer be the case on this proposal.
A second difficulty of the proposal to extend the spatiotemporal relations to causal sets from
which a spacetime emerges arises from our assumption of the unique existence of the embedding
spacetime. Uniqueness may be granted, but the problem is, once again, that relativistic spacetimes
only approximate causal sets. In exactly those domains for which a quantum theory of gravity
proved necessary, it will not be possible to map the causal set into a spacetime which is also a
model of general relativity. This should be expected to happen exactly in those circumstances
general relativity gives out. It is simply not nomologically possible, as far as general relativity is
concerned, to have a spacetime which faithfully describes our world in these regimes. And note
that these domains are believed to be part of our actual world. So we should not expect to find
a relativistic spacetime which emerges globally from the causal set and truthfully describes the
fundamental structure of our world.
Thus, if causal set theory is true of our world, then the basic elements of reality do not stand
in spatiotemporal relations and thus cannot populate the same possible world in Lewis’s analysis.
And as we have seen in §5, they also do not exemplify merely analogically spatiotemporal relations.
Given our failed attempts to precisely identify spatiotemporal relations at the fundamental level,
couldn’t the causal relation, which is fundamentally exemplified, be reinterpreted as a relation of
temporal precedence? After all, it partially orders the elementary events, which is exactly what
time does in special relativity. But this escape falls short on two counts. First, the theorems in §3
strongly suggest an interpretation of the fundamental relation as being closely related to causal,
not temporal, structure familiar from relativistic physics. Secondly, even if these connections are
ignored, we only recover temporal relations, and not spatiotemporal ones as demanded by Lewis.
This, in turn, would seriously exacerbate the third objection he discusses (1986, 73f; cf. §4 above),
which he already took to be the by far most troubling, as we would no longer have at least spatial
and temporal but only temporal relations. Therefore, the non-fundamental existence of spacetime
does not save the Lewisian analysis of modality.
8 Summary and outlook
In conclusion, if a true fundamental theory such as causal set theory ruled out spacetime as being
ontological part and parcel of the fundamental reality described by the theory, and if it was shown
how spacetime emerges as an approximation from the fundamental structure thus connecting the
theory to known physics and rendering it empirically coherent, then our actual world is not possible
according to Lewis’s analysis of modality. Or at least if this analysis is supposed to regiment more
than just emergent modality. Of course, the Lewisian could content herself with a theory of modality
restricted to the emergent level, thus covering almost all of human modal discourse. Nothing of
what I said precludes this restriction, but suffice it to say that such a restricted analysis would
neither be globally applicable as to include our theorizing about fundamental reality nor be based
on a fundamental and true understanding of our world. For both these reasons, the move to
emergent modality reeks of desperation. I see no principled reason why we couldn’t do better than
that.
The conclusion that on Lewis’s analysis, the actual world is impossible only depended on the
assumption that according to the most fundamental theory of gravity spacetime does not form part
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of the furniture of the world and on what I take to be a mild form of naturalism, viz. that the
fundamental structure of our world is best described by our best physical theories. Obviously, my
conclusion can be resisted by repudiating either of these premises. However, the first assumption
is supported—but of course not guaranteed—by recent developments in fundamental physics, and
in particular in quantum gravity. Given that there exists the serious possibility that spacetime is
absent from fundamental reality, I hope you agree, esteemed reader, that it is worth considering its
metaphysical consequences, at least if you share my mild naturalism. I hope to have shown that
these consequences may be significant.
References
Jeffrey A Barrett. The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds. Oxford University Press, 1999.
John S Bell. Speakable and Unspeakable. Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Stephen W Hawking, A R King, and P J McCarthy. A new topology for curved space-time which
incorporates the causal, differential, and conformal structures. Journal of Mathematical Physics,
17:174–181, 1976.
Nick Huggett, Tiziana Vistarini, and Christian Wu¨thrich. Time in quantum gravity. In Adrian
Bardon and Heather Dyke, editors, A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, pages 242–261.
Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2013.
David Lewis. On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell, 1986.
David B Malament. The class of continuous timelike curves determines the topology of spacetime.
Journal of Mathematical Physics, 18:1399–1404, 1977.
Tim Maudlin. Completeness, supervenience, and ontology. Journal of Physics A: Mathematical
and Theoretical, 40:3151–3171, 2007.
David Rideout and Petros Wallden. Spacelike distance from discrete causal order. Classical and
Quantum Gravity, 26:155013, 2009.
Jonathan Schaffer. Is there a fundamental level? Nouˆs, 37:498–517, 2009.
Lee Smolin. Generic predictions of quantum theories of gravity. In Daniele Oriti, editor, Approaches
to Quantum Gravity: Toward a New Understanding of Space, Time and Matter, pages 548–570.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
Edward Witten. Reflections on the fate of spacetime. Physics Today, pages 24–30, April 1996.
Max Zorn. A remark on method in transfinite algebra. Bulletin of the American Mathematical
Society, 41:667–670, 1935.
15
